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WHEN IS COMPETITION NOT COMPETITION: THE CURIOUS 
CASE OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
ROBERT A. BERENSON* 
ABSTRACT 
Policymakers routinely assume that Medicare Advantage plans and the 
traditional Medicare program compete for beneficiaries. Yet the District of 
Columbia federal district court blocked the proposed Aetna and Humana 
merger, finding that for purposes of antitrust analysis Medicare Advantage 
plans and traditional Medicare are effectively in different product markets. That 
is, they do not compete. This article reviews the basis for the court decision, 
which relied to a large extent on information that Medicare beneficiaries select 
their insurance coverage based on durable preferences either for the Medicare 
Advantage or the traditional Medicare option.  
The article explores whether the apparently durable beneficiary preferences 
are based on intrinsically different attributes of Medicare Advantage plans and 
traditional Medicare or, rather, importantly dependent on regulatory policies 
that with change would likely alter beneficiaries’ selections. The policies 
considered include: the maintenance of an archaic benefits structure in 
traditional Medicare, rules that limit access to supplemental Medigap insurance 
to wrap-around traditional Medicare, and the relative generosity of payments 
to Medicare Advantage plans.  
The article next considers approaches to explicitly promoting competition 
between the Medicare Advantage sector and traditional Medicare, finding the 
premium support approach that many market-oriented economists and policy 
analysts tout as a way to promote efficiency-producing plan competition in 
Medicare would likely reduce the insurance plan choices available to most 
beneficiaries. Further, although premium support proponents typically tout the 
virtues to unfettered market competition, only by adopting regulatory policies 
that constrain market forces would such an approach actually reduce spending. 
  
 
* M.D., Institute Fellow, The Urban Institute. This paper is a further development of a presentation 
at Saint Louis University School of Law’s 29th Annual Health Law Symposium: Coping with 
Health Care Market Concentration. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
“[Medicare Advantage] insurers compete not only with each other but also with 
[traditional Medicare] through the terms of the contracts or insurance plans that 
they offer beneficiaries.”1 
“The central market definition question in this case is about the nature and extent 
of any competition between Original Medicare options and Medicare 
Advantage.”2 
These quotes selected above represent a typical viewpoint of policy analysts 
about the competition between traditional Medicare (TM)3 and various private 
health insurance plans now labeled as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans in the 
MA program.4 The issue of whether MA plans compete in the same or a different 
product market as the TM program was central to a District of Columbia federal 
district court’s decision to block the proposed thirty-seven billion dollar merger 
of Aetna and Humana because of what it judged as its anti-competitive effects 
in violation of federal antitrust laws.5 A reason for the focus on MA was that 
Aetna and Humana have very high MA market shares in 364 counties across 
twenty-one states with questionable countervailing competitive forces.6 The two 
companies’ combined market share in the 364 counties ranges “from 1 to 34% 
of all Medicare enrollees, but 33 to 100% of Medicare Advantage enrollees,” 
pointing to the importance of determining whether TM is in the same product 
market as MA plans.7 
 
 1. Joseph P. Newhouse et al., How Much Favorable Selection Is Left in Medicare 
Advantage?, AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 2015, at 1, 3. 
 2. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 3. This article will refer to the government-managed Medicare program that has been in place 
since 1965 as the traditional Medicare (TM) program. Others have referred to it as Original 
Medicare and fee-for-service Medicare. What is Original Medicare?: Original Medicare Defined, 
MEDICARE INTERACTIVE, https://www.medicareinteractive.org/get-answers/how-original-medi 
care-works/original-medicare-defined/what-is-original-medicare (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 4. See Paul Wong & Subramiam Ramanarayan, Reduced-Form Versus Structural 
Econometric Methods in Market Definition: Lessons from Aetna-Humana, ANTITRUST HEALTH 
CARE CHRON., June 2017, at 18, 18, 20. The labels come from the Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066; see also Medicare Advantage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 2017), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Medicare-Advantage. 
 5. Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Greaney, Court Blocks Aetna-Humana Deal: The Mega-
Mergers Meet the Trump Administration Next, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/01/30/court-blocks-aetna-humana-deal-the-mega-mergers-meet-
the-trump-administration-next/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). In addition to the central issue of anti-
competitive effects in Medicare, the court also focused on “individual insurance sold on the ACA’s 
exchanges in 17 counties in three states where the overlap between the companies was significant.” 
Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Leemore S. Dafny, Good Riddance to Big Insurance Mergers, 376 N. ENG. J. MED. 1804, 
1804 (2017). 
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In operational terms, the court asked whether “a hypothetical monopolist of 
all the Medicare Advantage plans in a particular county could profitably impose 
a small but significant non-transitory increase in price on those plans—or 
whether substitution by seniors to Original Medicare options would make any 
attempted price increase unprofitable.”8 “Analyzed under antitrust law 
precedents, evidence that a segment of customers has a ‘durable preference’ for 
a product, such that other products would not constrain the exercise of market 
power by the merging parties, is usually dispositive.”9 
The court relied on two complementary sources of information presented in 
testimony by the parties in determining that MA operates in a different product 
market from TM.10 The “most persuasive” evidence the court found was the 
switching data, “that is, data about how often seniors leave Medicare Advantage 
plans and where they go when they do.”11 The court concluded that the switching 
data presents a “clear picture: Medicare Advantage enrollees rarely switch plans, 
but when they do, they overwhelmingly stay within Medicare Advantage.”12 In 
addition to the persuasive switching data, the court also relied on business 
documents that “make plain that, rather than focusing their efforts on 
competition with Original Medicare, Aetna and Humana focus on competition 
with other Medicare Advantage organizations.”13  
In the opinion, Judge Bates also relied on studies showing that those who 
developed a durable preference for MA plans likely prefer particular attributes 
MA plans have that TM lacks, including lower costs produced through a limited 
network, a cap on out-of-network spending, care coordination, and supplemental 
benefits like prescription drug coverage.14 The court did not hold that TM and 
MA did not compete at all, acknowledging that there is “a degree of 
competition,” as seniors chose between TM and MA plans, and noting that TM 
serves as a “starting point for Medicare Advantage plan design.”15 Nevertheless, 
the court held that such limited competition does not mean that TM and MA 
should be included in the same antitrust product market.16 
 
 8. United States v. Aetna Inc., F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 9. Gluck & Greaney, supra note 5. 
 10. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d, at 9. 
 11. Id. at 27. 
 12. Id. The court concluded that the lack of switching between the two sectors makes it 
“unlikely that competition from Original Medicare options will suffice to discipline Medicare 
Advantage pricing.” Id. at 42. 
 13. Id. at 41–42. Also, the court concluded that MA plans “compile impressive amounts of 
local, plan-specific competitive intelligence about Medicare Advantage offerings . . . across the 
country” but rarely compile similar information about TM or Medicare supplemental insurance 
plans. Id. at 42. 
 14. Id. at 41. 
 15. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d, at 22–23. 
 16. See id. at 23. 
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In the view of antitrust law professors, the court’s decision that MA plans 
and TM do not engage in meaningful competition was well reasoned and 
persuasive.17 Yet it begs the question of why a broad range of policy analysts 
consider that MA plans do—and should—actively compete with TM. In 
essence, how can MA plans not compete with TM for purposes of antitrust 
analysis yet be viewed as actively competing for purposes of general health 
policy analysis, as indicated in the selected quotes presented at the beginning of 
this article?18 
For decades, the option of private plan contracting in Medicare has pursued 
two goals, which sometimes come into conflict.19 The first is to expand 
Medicare beneficiaries’ choices to include private plans, which have different 
attributes from the TM insurance program.20 The second is to take advantage of 
potentially lower costs produced by managed care to reduce Medicare 
spending.21 Through most of its history, the first goal of increasing private plan 
options has been attained by paying more to health plans so they can provide 
extra benefits to attract beneficiaries to preferentially select private plans, now 
called MA plans.22 The information the court had in determining that 
beneficiaries had distinct and durable preferences for either MA or TM came at 
a time of overly generous, but declining, extra payments to MA plans.23 At other 
times, more emphasis on cost containment changed the relative attractiveness of 
MA plans compared to TM,24 which in turn alters beneficiaries’ preferences.  
This article explores why policy analysts routinely assume that private plans 
in Medicare compete with the TM program, whereas antitrust analysis has 
concluded that they do not compete sufficiently to place MA plans and TM in 
the same product market. This article explores various aspects of this seeming 
paradox.  
The article starts by clarifying the differences in general policy versus 
antitrust analysis of the competitive issues at play, making clear that a central 
policy focus has been on seeking to balance the two goals of beneficiary choice 
and cost containment by creating “level-playing field” competition between 
 
 17. See Gluck & Greaney, supra note 5. Health law professors Gluck and Greaney called the 
court’s decision “extremely thorough and grounded in a strong factual record” and delivered at 
“warp speed by major antitrust litigation standards.” Id. 
 18. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
 19. Thomas G. McGuire et al., An Economic History of Medicare Part C, 89 MILBANK Q. 
289, 290–91 (2011). 
 20. Id. at 290. 
 21. Id. It is not clear whether MA or TM can become more successful at reducing the growth 
rate of Medicare spending. Having a vibrant MA program competing with TM is one way to let the 
market decide while responding to beneficiary preferences. 
 22. Id. at 291. 
 23. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32–37 (D.D.C. 2017); see also McGuire et 
al., supra note 19, at 292. 
 24. See McGuire et al., supra note 19, at 291–92. 
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private plans and TM. Next, the article explores the topic of what characteristics 
of private plans and TM seem intrinsic to the particular option and which seem 
dependent on extrinsic policies that can alter beneficiaries’ decisions if not their 
underlying preferences. It also explores barriers to obtaining Medigap insurance 
and the differences in the benefits the different plans are allowed to offer as 
reasons why MA plans are relatively attractive to beneficiaries, pointing out that 
policy changes could alter these apparent beneficiary preferences. 
Next, the article explores policies that promote competition between private 
plans and TM, making the case that without these policy interventions, most 
beneficiaries would not have the choice between MA plans and TM that they 
currently enjoy in most geographic areas. These regulatory policies, some of 
which were adopted for reasons other than to promote competition, actually 
enable competition between private Medicare plans and TM, and permit 
beneficiaries to exercise their preferences between the insurance approaches. 
These regulatory policies include the prohibition on provider billings of 
beneficiaries that exceed Medicare-allowed amounts and a regime of 
administered pricing to establish government contributions or benchmarks 
against which MA plans bid established expressly to permit beneficiaries’ 
choices in many areas that otherwise would see either plans or TM dominate. 
Finally, the paper explores some of the reasons why premium support, a form of 
Medicare restructuring that converts Medicare from a defined benefit program 
to a defined contribution program,25 could seriously compromise the goal of 
offering plan choices to beneficiaries because of a dominating interest in cost 
containment. Policy proposals that require much more direct competition 
between private plans and traditional Medicare could perversely reduce 
beneficiary choice, undermining the durable preferences the court concluded 
that beneficiaries display.  
II.  WHEN IS COMPETITION NOT COMPETITION? 
The apparent paradox of MA plans and TM actively competing from the 
perspective of policy analysts and not competing for purposes of antitrust 
analysis apparently does not represent an exceptional situation. In the United 
States v. Aetna, Inc. decision, Judge Bates noted various interactions between 
MA and TM, including that “to be viable products, Medicare Advantage plans 
must control their costs—relative to Original Medicare—enough to offer 
beneficiaries more benefits or lower out-of-pocket expenses than Original 
Medicare does.”26 Yet while acknowledging that “any assessment of the 
 
 25. JOSEPH ANTOS, AM. ENTER. INST., PLAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE IN 
MEDICARE: THE CASE FOR PREMIUM SUPPORT 3 (Apr. 2013), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2013/04/-plan-competition-and-consumer-choice-in-medicare-the-case-for-premium-sup 
port_141511443922.pdf. 
 26. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2017). 
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competitive conditions facing Medicare Advantage plans must take the role of 
Original Medicare into account,” Judge Bates found that MA plans competed in 
a different product market than TM.27 
Implicitly addressing the apparent paradox, citing United States v. H & R 
Block, Inc., Judge Bates concluded, “Not every competitor—not even every 
competitor with a functionally interchangeable product—must be included in 
the product market.”28 He continued, “What matters is the extent to which 
competition from Original Medicare options would constrain the exercise of 
market power in Medicare Advantage.”29 In short, antitrust analysis requires a 
more granular application of the concept of competition, grounded in whether a 
competitor operationally faces market forces that constrain it from profitably 
increasing prices to consumers without losing business to competitors. 
Policy analysts consider a broad array of competitive issues between MA 
plans and TM, some of which have little or nothing to do with beneficiaries’ 
preferences. A dominant policy consideration is whether there is active and fair 
competition between private plans and TM. The most consistent and strongest 
articulation of this position has been presented by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which since 2001 has supported the concept 
of “level playing field” competition between an array of private plan types and 
TM.30 MedPAC advocates “financial neutrality” between MA plans and TM to 
further fair competition and to promote greater equity for beneficiaries living in 
parts of the country with markedly different per capita Medicare spending.31 
MedPAC has defined financial neutrality as follows: “[T]he Medicare program 
should pay the same amount, adjusting for the risk status of each beneficiary, 
regardless of which Medicare option a beneficiary chooses.”32 
The practical problem in establishing payment neutrality is that “in 
geographic areas with high levels of service use in FFS Medicare [TM], plans 
are able to provide a substantial level of extra benefits because they are able to 
 
 27. Id. at 23, 27. 
 28. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 54 (D.D.C. 2011)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. MedPAC calls for “payment neutrality” which has been equated with “level playing field” 
competition. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 112 (Mar. 2001); Mark Miller, Executive Director, MedPAC, Medicare 
Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans and Employer Groups (Apr. 11, 2008), https://www.nh 
pf.org/library/handouts/Miller.slides_04-11-08.pdf (noting the MedPAC MA “current 
recommendation, dating from 2001 [is] level playing field (neutrality) between the traditional FFS 
program and payment for private plans”). 
 31. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A 
MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 60 (June 2005). 
 32. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 24 (Mar. 2007). 
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reduce service use among their enrollees” as compared to unmanaged TM.33 In 
other geographical areas, where TM service use is relatively low, plans have not 
been able to provide as much or, in some cases, any extra benefits because it is 
more difficult to reduce service use below the TM level.34 These differences are 
often perceived as inequitable from a beneficiary perspective because 
beneficiaries in areas where TM service use has been lower, reflecting more 
prudent use of resources, were less likely to have plans offering extra benefits 
than plans in high service use areas.35 From this policy perspective, being able 
to assure beneficiaries’ preferences for health plans conflicts with beneficiary-
related equity considerations. 
Conversely, in considering equity, although beneficiaries do not have access 
to the same level of extra benefits through private plans that other beneficiaries 
enjoy, they do have access to providers that produce low-cost, high-quality 
services directly provided via TM.36 MedPAC observed that the inequities in the 
TM program are the opposite of those in the private MA plans.37 In short, 
preferences for either MA or TM have had a lot to do with the beneficiaries’ 
place of residence. 
However, while MedPAC’s financial neutrality is a useful guiding principle, 
there are multiple payment approaches that could satisfy it; that is, different 
methods exist for achieving level playing field competition. MedPAC described 
the choice concisely in a detailed review in 2009.38 At that time, the biggest 
cause of unlevel playing field competition was that MA plans in aggregate 
received 114% of TM spending, representing about twelve billion dollars more 
for the beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans than it would be spending if they were 
in TM,39 producing a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimation of $150 
billion extra spending over ten years.40 
In analyzing how to pay equitably in an attempt to assure level playing field 
competition, MedPAC created and analyzed four options Congress might 
consider for setting MA benchmarks against which MA plans bid to provide the 
 
 33. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING 
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 201 (June 2009). Though administered pricing to 
hospitals, physicians, and other providers accounts for geographic variations in input prices, extra 
funding for graduate medical education, disproportionate share hospitals, and other statutory-
recognized differences justify varying administered prices, and spending differences across 
geographic areas mostly represent differences in service use. See id. at xi. 
 34. Id. at 201. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. Further, at the state level, “[h]igher [service] use is correlated with lower quality” while 
“quality is higher in lower-service-use areas.” Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 201 tbl.7-1. 
 39. Id. at 172. 
 40. Id. at 184. 
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statutory benefits they are required to provide.41 MedPAC emphasized that all 
of the options are financially neutral to TM in the aggregate—and each would 
have cost the program the same as TM in the first year, saving twelve billion 
dollars.42 A main difference between the four options is that two linked 
benchmarks against which MA plans bid closely to 100% of TM spending in the 
local payment area.43 The other two options are linked more closely to expected 
plan costs, which vary much less than spending does across TM geographic 
areas.44 The latter two thus were designed to achieve payment neutrality 
nationally but not locally.45 Although the different payment options are 
financially neutral, the precise way in which payments would be determined 
would have produced very different distributional effects related to beneficiary 
out-of-pocket obligations, most importantly strongly influencing how 
competitive MA plans and TM were at the local level. 
In the decision, Judge Bates acknowledged that durable beneficiary 
preferences for either MA or TM depends importantly on a number of factors, 
including the extra benefits and the relatively low cost sharing that many MA 
plans offered.46 Yet the ability to offer extra benefits and lower cost sharing 
depends crucially on congressional control over the generosity of MA plan 
payment, which in turn now depends on the level of cost benchmarks against 
which plans bid. 
Enrollment in MA and its predecessor plans has varied significantly across 
the country based on how payments to MA plans were determined. Prior to the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), so-called “1876 Medicare risk” plans 
spread unevenly across the country because the plans were paid at ninety-five 
percent of the actual county-level spending in TM.47 In areas with high TM 
spending, private plans could provide the required statutory services for less than 
TM and therefore were able to attract enrollment by having the margins to offer 
substantial extra benefits.48 Conversely, in other geographic areas, private plans 
 
 41. Id. at 188. 
 42. Id. at 184. 
 43. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 188. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 191, 196. 
 46. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 28, 41 (D.D.C. 2017) (“But most MAOs 
[Medicare Advantage Organizations] do [differentiate themselves from Original Medicare] 
successfully, and create products different from Original Medicare in a number of important 
respects: they have a limited network, cap out-of-pocket spending, coordinate care, and generally 
offer supplemental benefits like prescription drug coverage.”). 
 47. Robert A. Berenson, Medicare+Choice: Doubling or Disappearing?, HEALTH AFF. 65, 
65, 67, 68, 71 (Nov. 2001), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2001/11/28/hlthaff.w1.65 
.full.pdf (noting that although plans were supposed to be paid ninety-five percent of the adjusted 
average per capita cost, because of a calculation error they were actually paid ninety-eight percent 
when the BBA was implemented). 
 48. See id. at 73. 
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could not successfully compete with TM in these lower-cost counties.49 The 
BBA and subsequent legislation50 aimed to provide broader choice for 
beneficiaries throughout the country, initially by establishing payment “floors” 
for paying private plans and later, in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), by varying the benchmarks from 95% to 115% of TM spending to 
more closely approximate private plan costs.51 
The specific payment method for MA plans that Congress adopts is meant 
to affect the take up of MA plans by Medicare beneficiaries across different 
areas, attempting to balance beneficiary choice, incentives for program savings, 
and notions of equity for beneficiaries. In the federal district court decision, 
Judge Bates acknowledged that Aetna and Humana contended the legislative 
and regulatory changes would likely make MA plans and TM more competitive, 
but he dismissed their arguments that current preferences depend on specific 
legislative and regulatory details that can vary, producing different beneficiary 
preferences.52 As demonstrated above, the payment designs and payment levels 
supporting MA have changed a number of times throughout the history of 
private plans in Medicare. Yet the court found that the need for MA plans to 
differentiate themselves from TM limits the extent to which either an MA plan 
or TM is “reasonably interchangeable” with the other.53 
In listing the attributes of MA plans,54 the court identified some 
characteristics of MA plans and of TM that are intrinsic to the model as well as 
some that are extrinsic and depend importantly on policy decisions that can and 
do change, just as payment levels change. As noted earlier, the court listed a 
limited network, a cap on out-of-pocket spending, care coordination, and 
supplemental benefits, like prescription drug coverage, as distinctive features of 
MA plans and not part of TM.55 Arguably, a limited provider network is an 
intrinsic feature of an MA plan in contrast to the freedom of choice of virtually 
any licensed provider, which seems intrinsically a characteristic of TM. 
MA plans have long provided care coordination as a distinctive difference 
from TM. However, in recent years, in a number of ways TM has adopted 
approaches to care coordination so that it may no longer be an intrinsically 
 
 49. See id. 
 50. For a legislative history, see McGuire et al., supra note 19. 
 51. Id. at 309, 321. Counties with benchmarks set at 115% of risk-adjusted TM costs have 
lower TM spending (in absolute dollars) than counties with benchmarks set at 95% of risk-adjusted 
TM costs. Id. However, the approach of varying benchmarks—the government contribution—to 
more closely approximate MA plan costs rather than county-level spending in TM was designed to 
promote beneficiary choice of either MA or TM in most parts of the country. See id. at 290. 
 52. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 53. Id. at 41. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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distinctive attribute of MA plans.56 And neither a cap on out-of-pocket spending 
nor supplemental benefits are intrinsic to MA. For many years, proponents have 
advocated for a cap on out-of-pocket spending in the basic Medicare benefit 
package, sometimes referred to as Part E of Medicare, and to facilitate a 
comprehensive program that packages what are now separate insurance 
programs for Part A and B benefits, acute care benefits, Part D drug coverage, 
and protection against catastrophic expenses and other cost-sharing obligations 
that Medigap insurance provides.57 Indeed, even Republican proponents of 
restructuring Medicare as a premium support program featuring explicit, fair 
competition between private plans and TM propose such a cap in TM.58 As 
noted, the availability of supplemental benefits by MA plans is not an intrinsic 
feature of all MA plans but rather depends on the level of payment that MA plans 
receive in relation to their costs, a factor that, in the history of private plans in 
Medicare, is subject to continuing change. 
III.  EXTRINSIC BARRIERS TO BENEFICIARIES EXERCISING THEIR PREFERENCES 
A particular extrinsic regulatory factor related to availability of Medigap 
supplemental insurance may be a reason why there is such limited switching 
between the MA plan sector and TM. Given gaps in coverage in the basic 
Medicare benefits and substantial co-insurance for some services, especially the 
absence of an annual or lifetime limit of out-of-pocket spending on Part A and 
B services, about twenty percent of Medicare beneficiaries enroll in Medigap 
plans offered by private insurers.59 As Tricia Neuman of Kaiser Family 
Foundation notes:  
Under federal law and in many states, [Medigap] insurers are not required to 
participate in an annual open enrollment period, and are only required to sell a 
 
 56. RACHEL BURTON ET AL., MEDICARE’S EVOLVING APPROACH TO PAYING FOR PRIMARY 
CARE 4–5, 8, 11 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95196/2001631_ 
medicares_evolving_approach_to_paying_for_primary_care_0.pdf. 
 57. See, e.g., Karen Davis et al., Medicare Essential: An Option to Promote Better Care and 
Curb Spending Growth, 32 HEALTH AFF. 825, 900–01 (2013); see also Robert A. Berenson & 
Melissa A. Goldstein, Will Medicare Wither on the Vine? How Congress Has Advantaged 
Medicare Advantage––And What’s a Level Playing Field Anyway? 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 5, 23–24 (2007). 
 58. See, e.g., See a Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER 
OF THE HOUSE 36 (2016), abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-Snap 
shot.pdf. 
 59. Tricia Neuman & Juliette Cubanski, The Gap in Medigap, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 
27, 2016), http://www.kff.org/medicare/perspective/the-gap-in-medigap/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2017). In contrast, all MA plans are required by CMS to provide such a limit, which is currently 
set at $8250. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ANNOUNCEMENT OF CALENDAR YEAR 
2017 MEDICARE ADVANTAGE CAPITATION RATES AND MEDICARE ADVANTAGE AND PART D 
PAYMENT POLICIES AND FINAL CALL LETTER 74 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Health-Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2017.pdf. 
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policy under specific circumstances, such as when applicants first enroll in 
Medicare at age 65 or within a year of trying a Medicare Advantage plan.60  
Medigap insurers are generally allowed to use medical underwriting to 
decide whether to accept an application and how much to charge as a premium 
for the particular Medigap policy a beneficiary selects.61 If a beneficiary applies 
for Medigap coverage after the initial open enrollment period or the one-time 
MA trial, Medigap insurers can impose a six-month non-coverage period for 
pre-existing conditions and can engage in medical underwriting and experience 
rating.62 In short, when trying to reenter TM from an MA plan, the beneficiary 
may lack both guaranteed issue and community rating, resulting in either denial 
of coverage for pre-existing conditions for six months or expensive premiums 
in perpetuity.63 Importantly, the applicable law does not require Medigap 
insurers to sell policies to disabled Medicare beneficiaries below the age of 
sixty-five, unless required to by certain states,64 such that only two percent of 
disabled beneficiaries have a Medigap policy.65 
In relation to beneficiary proclivities related to switching, the consumer 
protections—including an annual open enrollment period without pre-existing 
condition exclusions—do not apply to the Medigap market as they do to MA 
plans.66 This means that seniors who opt for an MA plan when they first go on 
to Medicare can effectively be locked out of the Medigap market if they have a 
persistent pre-existing condition, such as cancer.67 In short, under current rules, 
seniors who have once selected an MA plan partly may be able to obtain an out-
of-pocket limit to their financial exposure for medical care costs only if they 
remain in an MA plan. 
 
 60. Tricia Neuman, Traditional Medicare…Disadvantaged?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 31, 
2016), http://www.kff.org/medicare/perspective/traditional-medicare-disadvantaged/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2017). If the beneficiary has group health coverage through an employer or union, the 
Medigap Open Enrollment Period starts when the group insurance is terminated and the beneficiary 
seeks to join Medicare as a primary insurer. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CHOOSING 
A MEDIGAP POLICY: A GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE 16 (2017), 
https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02110-Medicare-Medigap.guide.pdf. 
 61. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 60, at 16. 
 62. Id. at 16, 33. 
 63. Id. at 14, 19. 
 64. Id. at 39. 
 65. Neuman & Cubanski, supra note 59. Overall, about sixteen percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries are eligible because of disabilities and eligibility in the end-stage renal disease 
program. Juliette Cubanski & Christina Swoope, A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts About the 
Medicare Program and the People It Covers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.kff.org/report-section/a-primer-on-medicare-who-is-eligible-for-medicare/ (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 66. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 60, at 14. 
 67. See id. at 16. 
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Further, the exposure to a Medigap rejection because of pre-existing 
conditions, common in an elderly population, could influence beneficiary 
preferences for MA or TM in the first place. As noted, the rules might dissuade 
MA enrollees from switching back to TM when they get a serious illness or 
injury and could partly explain why beneficiaries who do switch back to TM 
commonly switch back again to MA at their first opportunity in an open 
enrollment period.68 Others may choose to stay in TM all along because of the 
potential of not being able to obtain Medigap insurance if they want to return to 
TM. The difference in beneficiary access to the MA and Medigap markets 
suggests that durable preferences may be contingent on particular barriers to 
switching that are not inherent in beneficiaries’ actual preferences but are 
reflected in their pragmatic decisions when faced with statutory or regulatory 
barriers to the exercise of their preferences. 
The Medigap discussion raises an important issue that many observers think 
strongly affects beneficiary preferences for MA versus TM: the significant 
benefit gaps in Medicare. In particular, the traditional program has substantial 
cost sharing in the form of premiums, hospital deductibles, and co-insurance for 
Part B services, such as physician services, and a lack of coverage that limits 
beneficiary exposure to “catastrophic” expenses.69 MA plans bidding below the 
applicable benchmark that represents the government contribution are able to do 
better, producing benefits to enrollees by reducing Part A and B cost sharing, 
reducing Part B and D premiums, enhancing Part D benefits, and providing other 
benefits, such as vision and hearing services.70 
Other parties attempt to provide complementary insurance to fill the 
coverage gaps in TM.71 The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) 
“offer[ed] prescription drug coverage only through private plans, either stand-
alone private drug insurance plans or Medicare Advantage plans” offering drug 
benefits.72 This MMA decision “mark[ed] the first time in [Medicare’s] history 
that a [core] Medicare benefit [was not] available through the basic program.”73 
By requiring beneficiaries to receive prescription drug benefits only from a 
private insurer, the MMA effectively replaced the previous two-stop shopping 
 
 68. See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Steps to Reduce Favorable Risk Selection in Medicare 
Advantage Largely Succeeded, Boding Well for Health Insurance Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 
2618, 2621 (2012). 
 69. See An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2–3 (Apr. 2016), http://files.kff.org/ 
attachment/issue-brief-an-overview-of-medicare. 
 70. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: INCREASING THE 
VALUE OF MEDICARE 208, 208 fig. 9-2 (June 2006), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source 
/reports/Jun06_EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 71. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 69, at 3. 
 72. Karen Davis et al., Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option for Medicare 
Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF. 442 (Oct. 4, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005 
/11/15/hlthaff.w5.442.full.pdf+html; see also Berenson & Goldstein, supra note 57. 
 73. Id. 
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approach—TM and a separate supplemental insurance program—with three-
stop shopping for beneficiaries who otherwise are satisfied with staying in TM.74 
In fact, the MMA prevented Medigap plans from offering new prescription drug 
benefits, only grandfathering in established Medigap policies which have drug 
coverage,75 producing the three-stop shopping faced by beneficiaries in TM. 
Especially since many of the same private plans offering MA plans also offer 
the stand-alone Part D drug benefit, including Humana and Aetna, some 
beneficiaries likely find it simpler to just let the same insurer provide all their 
benefits, including the basic Medicare benefits. In fact, ten years ago Humana 
developed a near-national strategy for reaching virtually all Medicare 
beneficiaries with a stand-alone drug plan with a goal “‘to ultimately migrate 
those customers’ to their more profitable Medicare Advantage plans,”76 thereby 
promoting the relative simplicity of one-stop shopping. In the immediate 
aftermath of MMA implementation, Humana engaged in marketing abuses in 
their zeal to migrate beneficiaries from the TM by offering two additional private 
plans with its MA plan, in some cases giving its agents financial incentives to 
favor the selling of MA plans rather than Part D.77 It is interesting that the 
internal documents that Judge Bates reviewed apparently no longer emphasize 
Humana’s and other MA plans’ migration strategy, suggesting that the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’) regulatory oversight may have 
been successful in preventing marketing abuses. 
IV.  MEDICARE POLICIES THAT PROMOTE COMPETITION AND BENEFICIARY 
CHOICES 
MA plans are available to respond to beneficiary preferences only because 
they take advantage of particular rules in Medicare that permit the plans to pay 
hospitals and physicians at or near TM program rates, which are much lower 
than the rates commercial insurance plans pay.78 It is interesting to note that until 
 
 74. See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive ‘Level 
Playing Field’, HEALTH AFF. 576 (Dec. 15, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/ 
2004/12/15/hlthaff.w4.572.full.pdf+html. 
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(v)(1)(A) (2012). 
 76. Robert A. Berenson, Doctoring Healthcare, II, AM. PROSPECT, (Dec. 17, 2006), 
http://prospect.org/article/doctoring-health-care-ii (last visited Sept. 23, 2017) (quoting Mike 
McAllister, then Chief Executive Officer of Humana). 
 77. See Plan A: Hook Them with Part D, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 29, 2006, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-01-29/plan-a-hook-them-with-part-d (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2017). 
 78. See Thomas M. Selden et al., The Growing Difference Between Public and Private 
Payment Rates for Inpatient Hospital Care 34 HEALTH AFF. 2147, 2148–49 (2015) (noting the gap 
between TM payments and commercial health plan payments to hospitals has consistently 
increased, with commercial plans paying about ten percent more than TM in the late 1990s and 
seventy-five percent more in 2012). A recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
finds an even larger differential. Jared Lane Maeda & Lyle Nelson, An Analysis of Private-Sector 
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relatively recently, MA policy experts and relevant government agencies had 
simply assumed that MA plans pay hospitals at higher commercial insurance 
rates,79 implicitly assuming that MA plans were very effective at reducing 
service use to be able to price competitively with TM. It has now been shown 
that the reason MA plans are able to obtain TM prices is that the Medicare statute 
does not allow providers to bill patients more than would be allowed for payment 
in TM; that is, balance billing in excess of Medicare rates is not permitted in 
MA.80 Though legislated as a protection for beneficiaries, the limitation of 
payment to TM rates directly affects negotiating leverage between MA plans 
and providers.81 In essence, in the MA program, hospitals can choose to be “in-
network” at Medicare rates or “out-of-network” at the same rates.82 Such 
hospitals lack leverage to demand the higher commercial rates that most 
hospitals use their negotiating leverage to achieve. 
If MA plans had to pay at or near their negotiated commercial rates, they 
would not be competitive with TM virtually anywhere in the country. No amount 
of care management to reduce service use would overcome the pricing 
differential for hospital care or physician care;83 thus, they would be priced out 
of the market. Yet many proponents of the premium support approach to 
fundamental Medicare restructuring envision that market competition alone—
with a reduced government role in setting fees through administered pricing84—
 
Prices for Hospital Admissions 26 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper, 2017), https://www.cbo 
.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/workingpaper/52567-hospitalprices.pdf. Reviewing 
2013 claims from three large national insurers, the CBO found that commercial insurance rates for 
inpatient hospital services were eighty-nine percent higher than TM rates, but MA plan rates for 
inpatient services were roughly equal to TM’s rates, with no differences based on market 
characteristics such as MA penetration. Id. 
 79. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 13 
(Dec. 2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/12-08-
medicare.pdf; Berenson & Goldstein, supra note 57, at 16; see also Joseph R. Antos, The Wyden-
Ryan Proposal—A Foundation for Realistic Medicare Reform, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 879, 880 
(2012); McGuire et al., supra note 19, at 310; MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra 
note 33, at 201. 
 80. Social Security Act § 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 422.214 (2017). 
 81. Robert A. Berenson et al., Why Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Hospitals Traditional 
Medicare Prices, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1289, 1293 (2015). 
 82. Id. at 1292. 
 83. See Robert A. Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery: The Limits of 
Antitrust, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 711, 716–18 (2015). 
 84. Administered or administrative pricing determines the price of health coverage, such as 
the capitation rates that set the benchmarks for MA plans, from administrative records such as prior 
years’ health claims in the TM program. See Roger Feldman et al., A Competitive Bidding Approach 
to Medicare Reform, AM. ENTER. INST. 6 (Apr. 2013), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/re 
ports/reports/2013/rwjf405538. 
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would reduce Medicare spending.85 For example, prominent conservative policy 
analysts while recommending adoption of premium support as a core part of 
their Medicare Reform Agenda, never mention the need for this form of price 
regulation—a ban on balance billing to Medicare beneficiaries—and 
specifically criticize TM’s use of administered pricing, the very prices MA plans 
use to be able to compete with TM and each other.86 Former Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Tom Price, a longtime 
proponent of premium support, went further, when as a member of the House of 
Representatives, introducing legislation that would allow physicians to bill 
beneficiaries for charges that exceed Medicare allowed amounts.87 As HHS 
Secretary, Secretary Price continued to support such legislation, which would 
undermine the direct link between TM rates and the negotiated MA rates that 
allow MA plans to compete effectively with TM.88 
V.  MEDICARE RESTRUCTURING TO INCREASE COMPETITION COULD DECREASE 
BENEFICIARIES’ PREFERENCES 
Premium support89 proponents typically criticize the current MA program 
policy of varying the benchmarks against which MA plans bid, arguing that it is 
 
 85. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4655, A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR 
MEDICARE: ANALYSIS OF ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS 3 (Sept. 2013). Under the premium support 
approach, the federal government would contribute the same risk-adjusted amount toward coverage 
for each beneficiary in a region. Id. People who choose a plan (or TM) that costs more than the 
federal contribution would generally have to pay higher premiums, and those who choose less 
costly options could pay lower premiums or receive cash rebates or extra services. Id. at 2. Premium 
support proponents argue that the heightened competition created by requiring beneficiaries to use 
their own funds, dollar for dollar, to pay for plans more costly than the fixed contribution would 
reduce costs and produce savings for the government. Id. at 3. 
 86. See Joseph Antos et al., Improving Health and Health Care: An Agenda for Reform, AM. 
ENTER. INST. 43, 45 (Apr. 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Improving-
Health-and-Health-Care-online.pdf. A former Bush Administration CMS Administrator called 
CMS in their management of TM a “dumb price fixer.” Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Medicare World 
from Both Sides: A Conversation with Tom Scully, 22 HEALTH AFF. 167, 167 (2003). 
 87. See Medicare Patient Empowerment Act, H.R. 1700, 112th Cong. § 1802(b)(4) (2011). 
 88. See Virgil Dickson, MH Exclusive: Price Backs Balance Billing for Medicare Patients, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170309/NEWS/ 
170309880 (last visited Sept. 15, 2017). 
 89. Premium support is the term used to encompass restructuring Medicare from a defined 
benefit to a defined contribution program. ANTOS, supra note 25, at 8. Under the current Medicare 
structure of a defined benefits program, beneficiaries are entitled to all needed, covered services 
from TM (although without an out-of-pocket limit of their cost-sharing obligations); whereas under 
defined contribution, beneficiaries are given a fixed dollar amount to be used to purchase a private 
plan or TM in the marketplace. Id. at 3. With defined benefits, Medicare provides services; with 
defined contributions, Medicare provides a fixed amount of funding toward the purchase or 
services. See id. Proponents of premium support argue that in contrast to defined contribution, a 
defined benefit approach pays for services without limiting total spending, which is a unique 
approach to addressing Medicare’s spending growth. Id. at 3, 8. However, that is not really true. 
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wrong that the government would pay extra to private plans in areas where TM 
provides lower-cost coverage and equally wrong when it overpays TM in areas 
where approved plans offer equivalent care at lower cost.90 They argue, “There 
is no policy justification for selectively offering free, government-financed 
supplementary benefits to beneficiaries in one geographic region but not 
another.”91 In short, in the choice between the two goals of beneficiary choice 
and cost containment presented at the beginning of the article, these policy 
analysts come down clearly in favor of cost containment. They do not give any 
weight to a policy justification promoting beneficiary choice of insurance plan 
or program in order to empower beneficiaries to exercise their durable 
preferences for either MA or TM. 
A recently published paper has explored the reasons why the premium 
support approach, developed to promote market competition primarily to reduce 
Medicare spending, could severely reduce beneficiaries’ choices and, by doing 
 
The ACA established the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) as a mechanism to limit 
total Medicare spending if it was triggered by spending that exceeded a specified threshold, a 
mechanism that conservatives commonly criticize. 2017 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees 
of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 
THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS 178 (2017), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Re 
portsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2017.pdf; Editorial, Destructive Health Care Proposals, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/destructive-health-care-pro 
posals.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (“The [IPAB] has been vilified by conservative critics with 
outlandish charges that it will ration care, tell patients what treatments they can receive and disrupt 
doctor-patient relationships.”). Since passage of the ACA, Medicare spending increases have been 
below the threshold at which spending reductions need to be imposed. THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. 
HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, supra, at 178. The difference between 
the two approaches to limiting total spending then is premium support supposedly relies on market 
mechanisms (although as discussed earlier this marketplace would only work well by adopting 
price regulations and administered pricing currently in MA). ANTOS, supra note 24, at 19. The 
IPAB approach, however, more directly regulates spending. See THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. 
INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, supra, at 178. 
 90. Bipartisan Policy Center Debt Reduction Task Force: Hearing Before the Joint Select 
Committee on Deficit Reduction, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (testimony by Sen. Pete Domenici & Dr. 
Alice Rivlin, Co-Chairs, Bipartisan Policy Center Debt Reduction Task Force). 
 91. Id. at 8. Note that this policy position seems to equate equivalent care with equivalent 
benefits. See id. Presumably, beneficiaries with preferences for either an MA plan or TM are 
expressing judgment about differences in how their care is being provided, for example, whether 
they prefer care from a narrow, perhaps carefully selected provider network emphasizing care 
coordination and utilization management, or from a broad choice of virtually any licensed provider 
less subject to insurer oversight. Feldman et al., supra note 84, at 10. Another formulation of the 
same principle stated that “setting the government contribution to premiums at any amount greater 
than the competitively determined price of the entitlement benefits wastes money.” Id. at 6. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] WHEN IS COMPETITION NOT COMPETITION 157 
so, reduce the prospects for evenly achieving spending reductions.92 The 
following section briefly discuss some of the problems current versions of 
premium support—promoted as facilitating beneficiaries’ choices to discipline 
market competition93—have failed to appreciate. 
Because there is substantially more geographic variation in spending in TM 
compared to MA, following this policy principle of not paying extra to support 
beneficiary preferences, a principle that is assumed in most premium support 
proposals,94 TM would likely have a decisive price advantage in some regions, 
whereas private plans would surely dominate in other areas.95 Beneficiary 
choices would be diminished in both situations. Under current versions of 
premium support, relatively few geographic areas would have a level playing 
field for plan competition in which beneficiaries face comparably-priced 
premiums for private plans and TM, and could choose their preferred approach 
to providing insurance.96 
Another issue that premium support proponents neglect relates to risk 
adjustment. Risk adjustment is necessary to alter payment amounts based on the 
 
 92. ROBERT A. BERENSON ET AL., THE URBAN INST., RESTRUCTURING MEDICARE: THE 
FALSE PROMISE OF PREMIUM SUPPORT 9–13 (Oct. 2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files 
/publication/93801/aarp_24oct2017_1.pdf. 
 93. See, e.g., See a Better Way, supra note 58. Paul Ryan labels premium support a “consumer-
directed” approach, id. at 13, yet most versions of premium support being proposed reduce 
consumer choices. 
 94. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 85, at 9, 23 (discussing design features of premium 
support approaches); see also Paul N. Van de Water, Converting Medicare to Premium Support 
Would Likely Lead to Two-Tier Health Care System, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Sept. 
26, 2011), https://www.cbpp.org/research/converting-medicare-to-premium-support-would-likely-
lead-to-two-tier-health-care-system. 
 95. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 102–04 (June 2017). MedPAC shows how MA plan 
bids and TM spending compares across the country, id. at 102, and in the lowest spending TM 
quartile, the median for MA plan bids to provide statutory benefits for a beneficiary of average 
health status compared to TM spending in the same area is 1.06, id. at 104. At the other extreme, 
in counties with the highest TM spending the median MA plan bid is 0.73. Id. MedPAC’s analysis 
does not address current flaws in the risk-adjustment system that systematically overpays MA 
plans, an issue this paper addresses later in this section. 
 96. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 353–57 (Mar. 2017). MA is currently able to offer a wide array of private plans 
alongside TM in almost all parts of the country—an average of ten plans per county—precisely 
because the MA benchmarks reflect the greater geographic variation of spending in TM, compared 
with spending in MA plans. Id. at 353. In the MA program, the government contribution varies 
from 95% of the costs of TM to 115%. Id. at 357. The 20% spread, which is an artifact of 
administered pricing, facilitates competition and contributes to the presence of MA plans and TM 
in virtually all counties, whereas premium support generically would rely on actual private plan 
bids and TM costs to determine the government contribution, without adjustment to reflect the 
reality that TM costs vary much more geographically than do MA plan costs. See BERENSON ET 
AL., supra note 92, at 9–10. 
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fact that health care needs vary substantially across the Medicare population. 
MA plans bid to provide the services for the beneficiary of average health status 
but receives payments that are adjusted for actual health risks as measured by 
the diagnoses reported to CMS as documented in claims for payment or 
comparable encounter forms received from providers, especially physicians.97 
MedPAC has recently focused on the problem of MA plans’ aggressive 
approach to diagnosis coding, which raises the diagnosis-based “risk score” that 
is used to alter their average payment.98 The Commission found that Medicare 
Adjustment risk score growth through 2016 produced almost ten percent extra 
payments, about half of which were subject to reduction because of an 
administrative adjustment for the rise in coding intensity.99 These analyses are 
supported by recent attention to whistleblower suits against UnitedHealth Group 
Inc., the largest MA insurer,100 and other MA insurers that allege fraudulent 
inflation of risk scores.101 
In addition, independent of the plans’ ability to produce higher risk scores 
by aggressively finding diagnoses, studies continue to find that plans enjoy 
favorable selection when assessed through ways other than reported diagnoses 
to measure health status based spending differences.102 In the current MA 
program, such under-adjustment of risk selection is to the advantage of MA 
plans and the beneficiaries who select MA plans. However, because of the 
current defined benefit program structure, TM and the beneficiaries who select 
it are not disadvantaged; TM does not receive fixed, risk-adjusted contributions 
as it would under premium support.103  
However, when in full competition with MA plans under premium support 
restructuring, the overpayments to MA plans would produce a commensurate 
underpayment to the TM program, something that does not occur today under 
the defined benefit nature of TM. Furthermore, whereas MA plan managers are 
working hard to maximize plan risk scores, no one in TM is authorized to 
 
 97. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 96, at xxii. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 354 tbl.13-3. 
 101. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, A Whistle-Blower Tells of Health Insurers Bilking 
Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/business/dealbook/ 
a-whistle-blower-tells-of-health-insurers-bilking-medicare.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); see 
also, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, UnitedHealth Overbilled Medicare by Billions, U.S. Says in Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/business/dealbook/united 
health-sued-medicare-overbilling.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
 102. See, e.g., Newhouse et al., supra note 1, at 2; see also, e.g., Brown et al., How Does Risk 
Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program, 104 
AM. ECON. REV. 3335, 3362 (2014). 
 103. See BERENSON ET AL., supra note 92, at 1. 
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maximize TM’s risk scores,104 and no proponent of premium support has pointed 
to the imbalance in active management among MA plans and passive 
management to determine the bid of TM. This imbalance could produce 
systematic underpayment of TM relative to enrollee risk, causing the TM 
costs—and bid premiums—to rise each year to compensate for the shortfall. In 
some places, this likely would lead to a “death spiral” of TM and reduce the 
ability of beneficiaries to exercise their preferences for either an MA plan or TM 
when the latter is not available in their market.105 
Consistent with the spirit of the court’s decision in the Aetna-Humana 
merger case, others would disagree with this premium support policy 
prescription, noting that beneficiaries would not consider that private health 
plans and TM offer equivalent care, as premium support proponents assert.106 
Rather, as a policy prescription, one could argue that there is little policy 
justification for a premium support model that would deny the following 
benefits: care coordination, high performance networks, among other attributes 
of well-run private insurance plans to large parts of the country, the broad choice 
of providers, and less bureaucratic intrusion that TM offers in other areas.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For much of the past decade, Medicare per-beneficiary spending increases 
have been quite modest, lower than in any decade since Medicare’s inception in 
1965.107 This is in no small part due to measures adopted in the ACA and 
subsequent legislation. The rise in Medicare spending is not the result of a 
particularly inefficient government program that permits “out-of-control” 
spending but rather the result of caring for a rapidly growing Medicare 
beneficiary population that began in 2011 with the aging in of the baby boom 
generation.108 Given the reality of what is causing Medicare spending growth, 
fundamental restructuring of Medicare to provide defined contributions in the 
form of premium support is unwarranted. Rather, policy can continue the search 
for level playing field competition between the two sectors of private plans and 
the Medicare program to support what the court found were beneficiaries’ 
preferences for either MA plans or TM. Moreover, this article described removal 
 
 104. Erin Goetsch, Milliman, Principal & Consulting Actuary, Risk Adjustment and Its Use 
Within the Medicare Advantage Program (Oct. 11, 2012), at Slide 7, www.fchp.org/~/media/Files 
/General/BRRGoetsch.ashx. 
 105. BERENSON ET AL., supra note 92, at 13–14. 
 106. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 107. See generally THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. 
FUNDS, supra note 89, at 196–98. 
 108. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONTEXT FOR 
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 38 (Mar. 2017). Beginning in 2011, about 10,000 people age into the 
Medicare program every day. Id. at 32. Further, “Medicare enrollment is projected to grow by 
nearly 50 percent by 2030.” Id. 
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options for extrinsic barriers that interfere with both level playing field 
competition among plans and durable preferences for beneficiaries. The 
complementary goals of offering beneficiaries broad choices of health plan and 
TM options while reducing the trajectory of Medicare spending can both be 
achieved within the current structure of Medicare. 
 
